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Socrates described what would be lost to human beings in the
transition from oral to written culture. Socrates' protests...
are notably relevant today as we and our children negotiate
our own transition from a written culture to one that is
increasingly driven by visual images and massive streams of
digital information.1
I. Introduction
Privacy laws in the United States have been enacted to control
both government investigation into private lives and to deter
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intrusions by private persons.2 Communications between private
persons have often been targeted for such investigation and
intrusion.3 United States federal law provides more protection
2. There are both Constitutional and statutory federal privacy protections.
Constitutional protection most relevant to our examination is based on the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. As will be important to note in connection with United States v.
Steiger, Constitutional protection can only be invoked against the Government as the
alleged intruder, not for privacy intrusions by private persons. 318 F.3d 1039 (11th Cir.
2003) (discussed supra notes -125-39). The Fourteenth Amendment, through its due
process clause, makes the search and seizure provisions applicable to state defendants.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,655 (1961).
Statutory privacy protection for communications that will be primarily examined in
this article is that provided by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA") of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-22,
2701-12, 3121-27 (2006 & Supp. 2008)). Title I of the ECPA, and its predecessors, will
herein be termed the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22. Title II of the ECPA will be
referred to as the Stored Communications Act ("SCA"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12. Both the
Wiretap Act and the SCA deal with access to the content of communications, and are the
focus of this article. By contrast, less protection is provided when law enforcement
officials seek to access "addressing" information under Title III of the ECPA, which is
usually known as the Pen Register Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27. The analogy has been to
postal access: access to the contents of sealed letters usually requires court supervision
under the warrant upon probable cause procedure, but information on the outside of the
envelope (addresses, postmarks) were not protected as material in which there is a
"reasonable expectation of privacy." The Pen Register Act is only tangentially examined.
Additionally, the special provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50
U.S.C. §§ 1801-63 (2006), will not be examined. Many states have also enacted privacy
protections; courts when applying those state laws often consider interpretations of
parallel provisions in the federal statutes, so several state statutes will be discussed,
although a comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this article. Both the Wiretap
Act and the Stored Communications Act provide for civil actions to recover damages for
unlawful access to protected communications. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2520, 2707 (2006).
3. In the leading case on communications privacy, Justice Stewart developed the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test in finding that a man's Fourth Amendment right
to privacy was violated when FBI agents "attached an electronic listening and recording
device to the outside of the public telephone booth from which he had placed his calls."
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348-49 (1967). Justice Stewart explained:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. . . . But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.
Id. at 351 (citations omitted).
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against intrusion for communications of the human voice in the
process of transmission than it does for data transmissions such as
email and text messages.4 It provides even less protection for data
communications in digital or electronic storage.' As part of the
dramatic increase in use of "cloud computing," where remote servers
provide hardware and software for even such basic tasks as word
processing, more and more data, including communications, will be
stored on third-party servers.6 The foundation of different treatment
for stored communications, as well as the effect it will have on cloud
computing, is the focus of this article.
In examining the scope and limitations on privacy protections for
communications, courts have applied the U.S. Constitution, the
federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA"), and
other state and federal privacy statutes. Both legislatures and courts
have limited privacy protections where other interests are found to
conflict.' The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
has long provided protection for communications stored in either
document form or electronic form, so long as the storage was within
the home, or another place recognized by general search and seizure
law as a location in which the individual had a reasonable expectation
of privacy.8  However, electronic communications are not so
physically confined, whether stored or in transmission, therefore,
Congress and the states have provided statutory privacy protections
that echo, overlap, and extend Constitutional mandates.
The federal ECPA distinguishes between communications in
which the human voice is transmitted and other data transmissions,
such as email and text messages.9 The greater protection for voice
4. Under the Wiretap Act, some protection is provided for all communications
transmitted by wire, both data and voice; however, speech communications, defined as
"oral" and "aural" in 18 U.S.C. § 2510, are protected by the suppression remedy under 18
U.S.C. § 2515, but data communications are not.
5. Under the SCA, communications that are stored, rather than in transmission, are
not protected by a suppression remedy, process for access is less onerous, and statutory
civil damages for violations are less generous. See infra Part II.A for greater discussion of
differences between the Wiretap Act and the SCA.
6. "Cloud computing" is the popular term referring to the business model of
providing use of hardware and software as a service over the internet. Rachael King, How
Cloud Computing Is Changing the World, Bus. WK., Aug. 4, 2008, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/ content/aug2008/tc2008082_445669.htm.
7. "Where a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that
the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that
stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard." New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1), (2), (12) (2006).
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transmissions ends, however, when voice communications become
stored as voicemail. ° .-The statutory concept of storage is complex
and its application results in different levels of protection.1' Only
some communications that are stored in digital form may be in
electronic storage, as narrowly defined under the federal Stored
Communications Act ("SCA"). 2  Further complicating the
interpretation of the SCA, modern technology for transmitting emails
and text messages involves ephemeral periods of storage in the
process of transmission. 3 Similarly, the point at which a transmitted
communication becomes finally "stored" has been an issue."
Initially, this article compares specific statutory language to show
that law enforcement officers seeking to intercept communications in
transmission must make a stronger showing to obtain court
permission than those seeking stored communications. The private
remedy against violators for privacy intrusions prohibited under the
SCA likewise is also described in Section II and is shown to be a
lesser deterrent.
After setting out the statutory framework, Section III discusses
cases that provide specific guidance on whether a communication is
stored or in transit, and on issues that have been litigated when some
10. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism ("USA PATRIOT") Act amended § 2703
of the ECPA to place stored wire communications, that is, voicemail, within the ECPA
provisions that apply to stored electronic communication, such as e-mails. USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 209, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 283; see also supra note 5.
11. If a message is stored on an "electronic communications system" ("ECS") for 180
days or less, the message is protected from disclosure by a federal search warrant. 18
U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006). However, a message stored either on an ECS for over 180 days
or on a "remote computing service" ("RCS") is only protected by a subpoena or court
order. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(b) (2006). An ECS is "any service which provides to users
thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications .... 18 U.S.C. §
2510(15) (2006). An RCS is any service which provides to users "computer storage or
processing services by means of an electronic communications system .... " 18 U.S.C. §
2711(2).
12. "Electronic storage" is narrowly defined as "any temporary, intermediate storage
of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof;
and any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for
purposes of backup protection of such communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2006). The
Department of Justice takes the position that, where an email is acquired from post-
transmission storage, it is no longer in "electronic storage," as protected by the SCA.
COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, CRIMINAL Div., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 123-24 (2009) [hereinafter DOJ MANUAL],
available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/ssmanual/ssmanual2009.pdf.
13. The intermediate storage of information in the process of transmission raises this
issue in United States v. Councilman (Councilman 1), 418 F.3d 67, 70 (2005).
14. See infra notes 81-86.
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form of storage occurs during the process of transmission. This
section then analyzes the case law developing earmarks for
classification within the categories of stored communication protected
by the SCA. Next, Section III compares criminal cases, where
suppression of evidence is sought, to cases brought under the civil
claims provisions. It also notes the inconsistencies and limitations on
privacy protection for communications thus developed. First
Amendment cases and the application of freedom of information
statutes have also limited privacy protections for communications,
and Section III includes a discussion of them for additional
perspective in developing alternatives to the current statutory
framework.
This article, comparing legal protections for stored
communications to those for in-transit communications, was initially
begun as a paper for the Media in Transition Conference 6, which
gathered a cross-disciplinary group of scholars and professionals to
explore the theme "Stone and Papyrus: Storage and Transmission."' 5
This article concludes by suggesting that a reexamination of the
legislative treatment of the SCA is appropriate, given the impact of
"cloud computing" and digital technologies that preserve vast stored
reservoirs of personal communications and other data, and make that
information available for rapid and efficient transmission, search, and
retrieval.' 6  Specific changes addressed include a proposal for
15. Media in Transition: Mission, http://web.mit.edu/comm-forummit6/ (last visited
Nov. 5, 2009). The conference planners based the theme on a canonical text in media
studies in which Harold Innis distinguishes between time-based and space-based media.
HAROLD INNIS, THE BIAS OF COMMUNICATION 33 (University of Toronto Press 1999)
(1951). Innis argues that stone tablets are durable, and thus time-based, but are heavy so
have little spatial impact. HAROLD INNIS, EMPIRE AND COMMUNICATIONS 26 (Dundurn
Press 2007) (1950). Space-based media, such as papyrus and paper, are seen as more
powerful, though fragile, because they can be diffused widely, creating connections over
space. Id. at 27. Innis was writing in the years immediately after World War II, with a
background as an economic historian specializing in such traditional work as a history of
the Hudson's Bay Company. Id. at 13. The amazing impact of technology in the years
since shows a dazzlingly rapid set of transitions as we consider the time and spatial
dimension changes from stone tablets to papyrus to printing press to radio to digital
transmission.
16. In 1997, it was found that:
the United States digitally stores more than 400 billion documents, with
72 billion new documents being added each year. Digital document
storage and retrieval will become more and more prevalent. This is, in
part, driven by a change in cost structure. The cost of digital data storage
has decreased to the point where digital forms are the least expensive
means to store most of the information which traditionally would have
been printed or microfilmed.
2010]
extending the exclusionary remedy to violations of the SCA and a
proposal for repealing the civil claim remedy.
IL Statutory Framework
Privacy law in the United States has Constitutional roots. The
Fourth Amendment secures people "in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures," and
penumbral protection of privacy has been recognized under that and
other amendments of the Bill of Rights.17 However, the Fourth
A TP Focused Program Competition 97-04 Digital Data Storage, Advanced Technology
Program, National Institute of Standards and Technology (1997), available at
http://www.atp.nist.gov/press/97-04dds.htm.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See also supra note 2.
The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones
of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the
First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its
prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of
peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy.
The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination
Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government
may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment
provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described... as protection
against all governmental invasions "of the sanctity of a man's home and
the privacies of life."..... We have had many controversies over these
penumbral rights of "privacy and repose." These cases bear witness that
the right of privacy which presses for recognition here is a legitimate one.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (citations omitted). English
precedent has been cited for the principle embodied in the Fourth Amendment. The
phrase "the house of everyone is to him as his castle and fortress" appears in Semayne's
Case, (1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B.). However, modern historians suggest that the
Fourth Amendment went well beyond existing English precedent in protecting privacy.
The requirement that warrants uniformly limit their application to the
persons and places specified-the cornerstone of the Fourth
Amendment- transcended earlier guarantees by prohibiting
discretionary searches rather than merely qualifying them. This view of
the matter differs from traditional interpretations that characterize the
Fourth Amendment ... as little more than a hallowing of already existing
English and American legal triumphs.
William Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man's House Was Not His Castle: Origins of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 371, 372 (1980).
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Amendment applies only to intrusions by government, and its
application is weak and uncertain as applied outside the physical
home to information stored in electronic form rather than as
"papers."' 8  Thus, Congress enacted statutory protections for
communications in 1934,9 after telephone technology raised privacy
issues.20  Congress further developed the statutory framework in
1968,21 and most recently passed the ECPA in 1986.22
Under the different sections of the ECPA, the familiar procedure
of requiring probable cause for a search warrant is applicable to
wiretap surveillance of communications in transmission,23 while less
stringent procedures are needed for law enforcement agents to gain
access to stored electronic communications.24 However, employers
generally have been allowed to access employee email and other
internet usage stored on or transmitted through employer-provided
equipment outside of court proceedings and judicial supervision. 2
18. Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a
Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1209-13 (2004)
[hereinafter Kerr, A User's Guide].
19. The Federal Communications Act, enacted in 1934, provided: "No person not
being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish
the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning of such intercepted
communication to any person." 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (1934).
20. In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), the Supreme Court held
that wiretapping did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
21. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 outlined
protection for electronic surveillance, providing for court supervision: judges could
authorize wiretap warrants upon a showing of "probable cause" that an individual is, has,
or is preparing to break any of the laws listed in the act. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197. 218-21.
22. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848; see supra note 2.
23. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516-18 (2006).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2006).
25. "Although e-mail communication, like any other form of communication, carries
the risk of unauthorized disclosure, the prevailing view is that ... confidential information
[may be communicated] through unencrypted e-mail with a reasonable expectation of
confidentiality and privacy." In re Asia Global Crossing, LTD., 322 B.R. 247, 256 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2005) (collecting authorities). In determining whether an employee had an
expectation of privacy in emails sent or received on her employer's computer or email
system, a court should consider the following four factors:
(1) does the corporation maintain a policy banning personal or other
objectionable use, (2) does the company monitor the use of the
employee's computer or e-mail, (3) do third parties have a right of access
to the computer or e-mails, and (4) did the corporation notify the
employee, or was the employee aware, of the use and monitoring
policies?
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Courts and legislatures in the United States have also recognized
a countervailing public interest in making public some
communications that would otherwise be protected as private. First
Amendment claims have protected people from liability for disclosing
private information relevant to public issues, even when the
information was taken from unlawfully intercepted transmissions. 6
Freedom of information acts at the federal and state levels have been
invoked to compel the release of stored information created by public
officials.27 This article will primarily deal with the ECPA, rather than
Constitutional claims and state privacy legislation.
A. Privacy Protections for Communications Intercepted in Transmission
Under the Wiretap Act and Under the SCA
In-transit communications receive more protection from
interception than stored communications in three ways: (1) the more
Id. at 257.
26. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001). In the long duel over truthful
material released by Representative McDermott on a matter of public interest that was
initially recorded unlawfully, though not by the Representative, the Circuit Court for the
District of Columbia ultimately declined to rule on the scope of First Amendment
protection, but a concurring opinion suggests strong support for its application:
Although I agree that Representative McDermott's actions were not
protected by the First Amendment and for that reason join Judge
Randolph's opinion, I write separately to explain that I would have
found the disclosure of the tape recording protected by the First
Amendment under Bartnicki v. Vopper, had it not also been a violation
of House Ethics Committee Rule 9, which imposed on Representative
McDermott a duty not to "disclose any evidence relating to an
investigation to any person or organization outside the Committee unless
authorized by the Committee. Although the Court does not and need
not reach the Bartnicki issue to resolve the matter before us, two
previous panels in this case have held that the congressman's actions
were not protected by the First Amendment. I believe it is worth noting
that a majority of the members of the Court-those who join Part I of
Judge Sentelle's dissent-would have found his actions protected by the
First Amendment.
Boehner v. McDermott, 484 F.3d 573, 581 (2007) (Griffith, Cir. J., concurring).
27. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 2008); U.S. Department of Justice: General Information
about the Freedom of Information Act, http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/index.html (last visited
Nov. 5, 2009) (explaining that the Freedom of Information Act "applies only to federal
agencies and does not create a right of access to records held by Congress, the courts, or
by state or local government agencies. Each state has its own public access laws that
should be consulted for access to state and local records."). See also Joe Swickard, Steps in
the Text Message Scandal, THE DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 10, 2009, available at
http://www.freep.com/article/20090310/NEWS01/903100351/; M. Elrick, Judge Rules that
Kilpatrick, Beatty Texts are Public Record, THE DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 4, 2009,
available at http://www.freep.com/articlei20090304/NEWS01/90303093/.
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stringent requirements for obtaining a warrant for wiretaps then for
accessing stored communications; (2) the absence of an exclusionary
rule for evidence unlawfully obtained in violation of the SCA or for
data communications unlawfully intercepted in transmission; and (3)
the lesser provision for statutory damages in civil claims for violation
of the SCA than of the Wiretap Act.
1. Lawful Access to Communications Under the Wiretap Act and Under the
SCA
The Wiretap Act, as amended by the ECPA, makes it illegal for
anyone to "intentionally intercept.., any wire, oral, or electronic
communication., 28 "Intercept" is defined in the Wiretap Act as the
"acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral
communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or
other device., 29  However, a procedure for allowing interception
under impartial judicial supervision3" has been provided for the
investigation of certain enumerated serious crimes.31 Significantly,
the Wiretap Act's procedure is more restrictive than the usual Fourth
Amendment warrant procedure for a lawful search or seizure, and
has thus been described as a "super" warrant.32 Under the Wiretap
Act, a law enforcement officer may request a court to permit
interception by an application that includes a sworn statement of
facts, obtained from an independent investigation, to justify his belief
that the interception should be permitted, including:
(i) details as to the particular offense that has been, is being,
or is about to be committed, (ii)... a particular description of
the nature and location of the facilities from which or the
place where the communication is to be intercepted, (iii) a
particular description of the type of communications sought to
be intercepted, [and] (iv) the identity of the person, if known,
committing the offense and whose communications are to be
intercepted .... ."
Further, the requesting officer must declare "whether or not other
investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they
28. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(1) (West 2008).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2006).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2006).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2006).
32. Kerr, A User's Guide, supra note 18, at 1232.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b).
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reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous. '' 34
The judge reviewing the application may issue a time-limited
order35 permitting interception if it is found that
(a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is
committing, has committed, or is about to commit [the list of
serious crimes referred to above]; (b) there is probable cause
for belief that particular communications concerning that
offense will be obtained through such interception; [and] (c)
normal investigative procedures have been tried and have
failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried
31
or to be too dangerous....
In contrast, the SCA addresses access to protected stored
communications, rather than interception of in-transit
communications.37 Penalties are set forth for whoever
(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility
through which an electronic communication service is
provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to
access that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents
authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while
it is in electronic storage . ..."
However, there is no crime, or parallel civil action, where the access is
"authorized. 3 9 Authorization may be granted by persons other than
a party to the communication, including the provider of the wire or
electronic communications service, by a user of the service with
respect to a communication of that user or intended for that user, or
by a process significantly less protective than the process for
interception under the Wiretap Act, as described above.4°
The process for obtaining authorization to obtain stored
electronic communications requires court-supervised warrant-based
access to communications stored for 180 days or less, although
privacy safeguards are fewer than those for communications covered
34. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c).
40. Id. See also supra notes 32-36.
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under the Wiretap Act.4" Stored communications within a 180-day
period may be accessed "pursuant to a warrant issued using the
procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a
court with jurisdiction over the offence under investigation or
equivalent state warrant.,1 2 Those rules are less onerous than the
wiretap "super" warrant procedure described above. The law
enforcement investigator seeking access to the communications may
obtain the warrant upon a probable cause showing that the material
sought is likely to provide evidence of a crime, 3 and there is no
specified list of crimes limiting the scope of such an order, unlike the
list in the Wiretap Act."4 The applicant is not required to show that
other investigative procedures have been tried and have failed, or are
unlikely to succeed, or are too dangerous. Congress has also
instituted a reporting requirement for wiretap warrants,45 mandating
recordkeeping and public access to those records, but has not done so
for access to stored communications.
If the communication has been in electronic storage for more than
180 days, it can be accessed by a governmental agent by obtaining a
subpoena or court order merely upon a showing that "there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic
communication.., are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation." 
46
2. Statutory Exclusion of Evidence Under the Wiretap Act and Under the
SCA
Both the Wiretap Act and the SCA contain strong civil
enforcement remedies 7 in addition to imposing criminal sanctions for
unlawful intrusions into the privacy of communications. However,
most cases interpreting the Wiretap Act privacy protections have
arisen in the criminal context, where suppression of evidence is
sought on the ground that the interceptor violated the process set
forth in the act. 8
41. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006) with 18 U.S.C. § 2518.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
43. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (b), (c)(1) (2007).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2006).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 2519 (2006).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b), (d) (2006).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2707 (2006).
48. Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the "Fog" of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression
Remedy Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805. 824 (2003)
[hereinafter Kerr, Lifting the "Fog"].
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The Wiretap Act contains a stringent rule excluding any
unlawfully obtained wire or oral communication from use as evidence
in any proceeding. 9 The absence of any such provision for unlawful
access to stored communications or for unlawful interception of
electronic communications that do not contain the human voice
clearly signals an intent by Congress to treat such intrusions into
privacy differently. However, the rationale for differentiating
between the two is not so clear here as in other respects. Both
statutes have powerful civil claims provisions, but the absence of an
exclusionary remedy (or an injunctive remedy, as is provided under
the Wiretap Act50) may suggest that Congress is more concerned that
law enforcement officials will misuse wiretaps on communications
containing the human voice than will unlawfully access data
communications or stored communications. Alternatively, as in the
other points of different treatment, it may suggest that Congress
values the privacy interest in oral communications in transit more
than privacy in data and stored communications. Similarly, following
the line of analysis applied to Fourth Amendment protection against
search and seizure, Congress may have determined that individuals
have a higher expectation of privacy for oral communications in
transit, as compared to data in transit and stored communications.
The legislative history of the ECPA of 1986 offers little guidance.
There was much support in Congress for a comprehensive revision of
the ECPA in 2000 that would have heightened privacy protections.
The bill, as reported out of committee, included extension of the
suppression remedy to electronic non-voice communications in
transit, and also to stored voicemail and email messages." The
49. "Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the
contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in
evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding ... if the disclosure of that information
would be in violation of this chapter." 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2006).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 2521 (2006).
51. House Committee Delays Adoption of Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
TECH L.J., Sept. 22, 2000, available at
http://www.techlawjournal.com/privacy/20000922.asp.
52.
Currently, only illegally obtained "wire and oral communications" are
excluded from use as evidence by statute. H.R. 5018 would amend the
"statutory exclusionary rule" to also exclude from use as evidence
illegally intercepted "electronic communications" and illegally obtained
"electronic communications in electronic storage," namely stored e-mail
messages, resulting from violations [of] the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act ....
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2000, H.R. REP. No. 106-932, at 15-16 (2000).
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proposal died as the Clinton administration ended, and was not
revived the following year when terrorism concerns, raised by the
events of September 11, 2001, drained support for privacy law
extension. 3
Scholars have urged that an exclusionary rule be adopted for
unlawful intrusions into stored communications.' They argue that
civil litigation has been the usual response to violations of the SCA,
resulting in courts deciding on its interpretation in the context of
53. Sandra McKay, The Evolution of Online Privacy: 2000-2003, J. LEGAL, ETHICAL
AND REG. ISSUES, at 4-5 (2003), available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mlTOS/is26/ ai n25080548/?tag=content;coll.
As the result of an FTC survey that found only 20 percent of all
websites and less than half of the 100 most popular sites used industry-
accepted fair information practices, such as letting users opt out, the
agency called on Congress to protect consumers through laws that would
establish standard practices for collection and use of online data.
Legislators responded and an abundance of privacy bills were introduced
into Congress during the years and months immediately preceding the
events of September 11, 2001. After the 2000 Congressional session in
which dozens of Internet privacy bills died in committee and others
languished without any indication of being recommended for a full vote,
the general conviction was that year 2001 could be the year for breaking
the impasse over Internet privacy.
Early 2001, privacy advocates, industry trade groups, and legislators
alike believed that some federal government actions seemed
unavoidable. Privacy advocates saw hope in the Senate's sudden shift to
Democratic control .... Pres. Bush's decision to implement the medical
privacy regulations approved late in the Clinton administration provided
further expectations of federal action in the belief that it would heighten
awareness of privacy issues. And the FTC remained a strong advocate of
new federal laws on privacy. . . .The question for many industry
executives had shifted from "will" there be new legislation to "what"
issues will new laws address.
The heinous terrorist acts of September 11 marked a significant
turning point in the debate over privacy. Such an event changes the
balance between security and privacy, giving new weight to calls for
broader government surveillance powers. Swept up in a tide of
emotional fear and anger, the immediate response for most Americans
was for greater security and protection from further attacks. In the face
of potential catastrophic danger, most would choose to relinquish some
privacy rights in favor of a safer, more secure world.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
54. See generally Michael S. Leib, E-mail and the Wiretap Laws: Why Congress
Should Add Electronic Communication to Title III's Statutory Exclusionary Rule and
Expressly Reject A "Good Faith" Exception, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 393 (1997); Kerr, A
User's Guide, supra note 18, at 1241-42.
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weighing the interests of a plaintiff claiming injury against interests of
civil defendants.5 In comparison, the interpretation of the Wiretap
Act exclusionary rule has been litigated in the context of weighing a
criminal defendant's civil liberties against intrusions by law
enforcement officials.56
3. Statutory Damages for Violation of the SCA
Congress has also signaled that it places a higher value in
preserving privacy for communications in transit as compared to
stored communications in the provisions for civil damage claims
provided under both acts.57 Provisions for the awarding of attorneys'
fees and punitive damages, as well as actual and statutory damages,
create significant incentives for civil claims to deter unlawful access to
stored communications and unlawful interception of in-transit
communications. Statutory damages here are particularly important
given the uncertainty and costs of proving actual damages. However,
the statutory damages provision for violations of the SCA sets a
minimum recovery for a violation at $1,000, although if actual
damages are greater they would be available. 8  If there is an
interception in violation of the Wiretap Act, however, statutory
damages are set at $10,000 per violation or $100 per day of the
continuing violation, whichever is greater. 9
4. Treatment of Different Types of Communications Under the ECPA
The suppression remedy granted under the Wiretap Act,6 ° which
prohibits the use of unlawfully obtained wiretap evidence being used
in trial, is not made available to stored communications or to non-
voice communications in transit, as noted above. The statutory
language makes clear that the protection afforded by the suppression
remedy is limited to a "wire or oral communication. ' '61 In the
definitional provision of the statute, electronic communication is
expressly distinguished as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing,
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in
whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or
photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce, but
55. Leib, supra note 54, at 436; Kerr, A User's Guide, supra note 18, at 1241-42.
56. See Kerr, Lifting the "Fog," supra note 48, at 829.
57. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2520,2707, 2712 (2006).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c) (2006).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2)(B) (2006).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2006).
61. Id.
does not include- (A)any wire or oral communication... .,,62 An oral
communication is defined as "any oral communication uttered by a
person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not
subject to interception under circumstances justifying such
expectation, but such term does not include any electronic
communication... ,,63 A wire communication is defined as:
Any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of
facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of
wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of
origin and the point of reception (including the use of such
connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by
any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities
for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications
or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce.'
An aural transfer is defined as "a transfer containing the human
voice at any point between and including the point of origin and the
point of reception ... ,,65 The legislative history clarifies that an
''oral" communication is an utterance by the human voice that travels
by sound waves and a "wire" communication is an utterance carried
as an electrical impulse by wire or other device: "An oral
communication is an utterance by a person under circumstances
exhibiting an expectation that the communication is not subject to
interception, under circumstances justifying such an expectation. In
essence, an oral communication is one carried by sound waves, not by
an electronic medium."6
In describing and protecting oral communications, the ECPA of
1986 thus incorporated the standard for privacy protection under the
Fourth Amendment that the U.S. Supreme Court articulated in Katz
v. United States in 1967, with respect to eavesdropping outside the
Fourth Amendment-protected physical confines of the home.67 In
that case, a device had been placed to pick up the content of voice
communications uttered by a speaker in a public phone booth.6 8 The
recorded evidence obtained was excluded when the court determined
62. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2006) (emphasis added).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2006).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2006).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(18) (2006).
66. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 13 (1985), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3567.
67. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
68. Id. at 348.
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that one can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in activities
beyond the home. 9
In recognition that human voice communications were being
carried by technological means well beyond the copper wire of
original telephones, and seeking to protect those voice
communications as well, the ECPA protected "wire"
communications, extending the definition to include:
the whole of a voice telephone transmission even if part of the
transmission is carried by fiber optic cable or by radio-as in
the case of cellular telephones and long distance satellite or
microwave facilities. The conversion of a voice signal to
digital form for purposes of transmission does not render the
communication non-wire. The term "wire communication"
includes existing telephone service, and digitized
communications to the extent that they contain the human
voice at the point of origin, reception, [sic] or some point in
between. A private telephone system established by a
company whose activities affect interstate commerce, would
also be covered.7°
Thus, the statute protects transmissions of content produced by
the human voice from interception with the powerful exclusionary
rule, but does not offer that protection to content in written or other
non-oral form, whether in transmission or as stored communications.
Initially, the ECPA had extended the protection for voice
communication to stored "voice mail,"7' but that protection was
removed in the USA PATRIOT Act 72 to allow wider surveillance in
the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001.7
69. Id. at 361 ("The rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable."') (Harlan, J., concurring).
70. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 12.
71. The Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and
Trademarks amended subparagraph (D) to specify that wire communications in storage
like voice mail, remain wire communications, and are protected accordingly. Id.
72. The USA PATRIOT Act amended § 2703 of the ECPA to place stored wire
communications, that is, voice mail, within the ECPA provisions that apply to stored
electronic communication such as e-mails. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 209, Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 283.
73. Peter P. Swire, Katz is Dead. Long Live Katz., 102 MICH. L. REV. 904, 911, 915
(2004).
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The SCA does protect messages in electronic storage, but defines
that category narrowly so that not all stored materials receive
protection. "'[E]lectronic storage' means-(A) any temporary,
intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental
to the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such
communication by an electronic communication service for purposes
of backup protection of such communication .... .7
The statutory distinctions that create differences in protection
depend on the characterization of the storage provider and the nature
of the materials. The statute sets up two categories of third parties
holding stored communications, the "electronic communications
service" and the "remote computing service., 75  The essential
distinction between the two is that, while a remote computing service
may hold a stored communication, it is doing so to provide operations
on data rather than holding it in the context of the transmission itself.
The concept originally was designed to cover electronic data sent by
its owner to a third party who would provide services, such as
accounting, database storage, and management that, under the state
of technology in 1986, would be beyond the capacity of most business
76
computers. In 2010, it would presumably cover "Web 2.0" and
74. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2006).
75. The term "remote computing service" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) of the
SCA and "electronic communication service" is defined in 18 U.S. C. § 2510(15) of the
Wiretap Act. The distinction determines who may lawfully consent to disclosure of the
message under 18 U.S.C. § 2701(b)(3): a message held by an ECS can lawfully be disclosed
without a warrant only to the originator and the intended recipient, while a message held
in an RCS can lawfully be disclosed to the subscriber to the service as well.
The legislative history of the term "remote computing service," provides a more
detailed explanation:
In the age of rapid computerization, a basic choice has faced the users
of computer technology. That is, whether to process data inhouse on the
user's own computer or on someone else's equipment. Over the years,
remote computer service companies have developed to provide
sophisticated and convenient computing services to subscribers and
customers from remote facilities. Today businesses of all sizes-
hospitals, banks and many others-use remote computing services for
computer processing. This processing can be done with the customer or
subscriber using the facilities of the remote computing service in
essentially a time-sharing arrangement, or it can be accomplished by the
service provider on the basis of information supplied by the subscriber or
customer. Data is most often transmitted between these services and
their customers by means of electronic communications.
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 10-11(1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3564-64.
76. Kerr, A User's Guide, supra note 18, at 1215; DOJ MANUAL, supra note 18, at
119.
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"cloud computing,"77 which can be used to slim down the computing
requirements at the owner's end to simpler devices with low capacity
hardware and only browser software. The Department of Justice has
taken the position, usually successfully, that communications held by
a "remote computing service" are not entitled to "super" warrant
protection as in-transit communications, but rather have merely
become records subject to simple subpoena or court order process.78
Il. Guiding Cases
B. "Stored" or "In Transmission?"
Modern technologies for transmitting emails and text messages
have created ambiguity in determining whether a particular access is
to a communication in transit or when it is a stored communication.
Emails and other messages may repose at points between origin by
the sender and reception by the intended recipient; the status of
messages once read but still retained has also been litigated.79 If
unlawful access occurs when a message is stored, then a criminal
defendant cannot maintain that it should be excluded from
evidence.' Civil damages for violation of the privacy protections
under the ECPA are available both where the messages are stored
and where they are still considered to be in transit, but, as noted
77. Cloud Computing: Creating Value for Web 2.0 Apps,
http://www.vlab.org/article.html?aid=188 (last visited Oct. 22, 2009); Tim O'Reilly, Web
2.0 and Cloud Computing, Oct. 26, 3008, available at http://radar.oreilly.com/2008/10/web-
20-and-cloud-computing.html.
78. DOJ MANUAL, supra note 12, at 120.
However, this "either/or" approach to ECS and RCS is contrary to the
language of the statute and its legislative history. The definitions of ECS
and RCS are independent of each other, and therefore nothing prevents
a service provider from providing both forms of service to a single
customer. In addition, an email service provider is certainly an ECS, but
the House report on the SCA also stated that an email stored after
transmission would be protected by a provision of the SCA that protects
contents of communications stored by an RCS. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-
647, at 65 (1986). One subsequent court has rejected the Ninth Circuit's
analysis in Quon and stated that a provider "may be deemed to provide
both an ECS and an RCS to the same customer." Flagg, v. City of
Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 362 (E.D. Mich. 2008). The key to determining
whether the provider is an ECS or RCS is to ask what role the provider
has played and is playing with respect to the communication in question.
79. Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir. 2004).
80. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2518(10)(a) (2006) (applying only to intercepted
communications).
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above, the cap on statutory damages is smaller for stored messages.
For stored messages, a plaintiff has also been required to show actual
damages before being allowed to recover statutory damages at all.'
Because of the different treatment of messages, stored or not,
courts have analyzed whether a message is considered stored at the
following points in time: the period between the entry of keystrokes
on a keyboard and the giving of the command "send" when the
entered message is held in the internal memory of the sending
computer;8 the period during relayed transmission when the message
packets are reassembled at an intermediary node and held briefly
before being repacketized and sent on to the intended recipient; ' the
period during receipt by the intended recipient when the contents of
the communication are displayed on a monitor simultaneously with
being stored on a hard drive;85 during access by remote examination
of information stored on a hard drive, after intended recipient has
viewed the contents;6 during access to emails, including those unread
by intended recipient, after unlawful seizure of computers of intended
recipient;87 and during access to viewed emails.8
In United States v. Ropp, the defendant was charged with
interception under the Wiretap Act.89 The defendant had installed a
device, called a KeyKatcher, on the cable conducting electrical
impulses from the keyboard to the central processing unit of a
desktop computer normally operated by an insurance company
employee. 90 The device would enable Ropp, upon recovery of the
device, to access the content of all keystrokes made by the operator. 91
At the time the keystrokes were recorded, the computer was
connected to the internet, but the message being composed on the
81. See supra note 57.
82. Van Alstyne v. Electronic Scriptorium, Ltd., 560 F.3d 199, 208 (4th Cir. 2009).
83. United States v. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d 831, 832 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
84. United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 70 (1st Cir. 2005).
85. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 899 So.2d 1133, 1137 (5th Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
86. United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1041-44 (11th Cir. 2003).
87. See, e.g., Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 461 (5th
Cir. 1994); Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 626 (E.D. Pa. 2001);
Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 813
(2004).
88. See, e.g., Wesley College v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 384 (D. Del. 1997); Garcia v.
Haskett, No. C 05-3754 CW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46303, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal June 30,
2006).
89. United States v. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d 831, 832 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (finding
defendant guilty of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)).
90. Id. at 831.
91. Id. at 832.
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keyboard had not yet been "sent" with a command from the
operator.9 The court easily found that there had been an
interception of an electronic signal, but focused its inquiry on whether
the intercepted signals were an electronic communication protected
by the Wiretap Act. 93 The relevant language for that analysis was in
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12): "whether the signals were transmitted 'by a
system ... that affects interstate or foreign commerce."'94
U.S. District Court Judge Feess did not accept the Government's
argument that the signals were transmitted to a system that affects
interstate commerce simply because the computer was connected to
the internet at the time, nor did he focus on the statutory
jurisdictional element that the transmission be through a system that
affects interstate commerce. 95 Instead, Judge Feess found that the
signals were still internal to the computer itself, rather than being in
transit.96 The defendant's indictment under the Wiretap Act was
dismissed because the judge found that there had been no
interception of a communication because the information had not yet
been sent. 97  In doing so, Judge Feess distinguished between
interception of an electrical signal within a computer and interception
of a communication in the process of transmission.98 Although a later
case has criticized the reasoning in Ropp in finding that interstate
commerce was not involved, the latter judge did not reach the more
fundamental question of whether the message being prepared was in
a state of transmission before the "send" command was given. 99 In
finding that the message was not in transmission, as well as not being
in transmission in interstate commerce, Judge Feess relied heavily on
the reasoning in the 2004 First Circuit decision in United States v.
Councilman, which has subsequently been vacated and reversed after
en banc review." The Councilman case, discussed in more detail
below, involved interception after the commencement of a
transmission and therefore did not specifically apply to the issue in
92. Id. at 837.
93. Id. at 834.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 837.
96. Id. at 838.
97. Id. at 835 n.1.
98. Id. at 837.
99. Bramana v. Lembo, No. C-09-00106 RNW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42800, at *8
(N.D. Cal. May 20, 2009).
100. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 836-37 (analyzing United States v. Councilman
(Councilman I1), 373 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2004); vacated en banc, Councilman 1, 418 F.3d 67
(1st Cir. 2005)).
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Ropp: the status of a message being prepared for transmission but not
yet sent.
Significantly, Judge Feess analyzed the implications of a case
where the Government had tailored its interception of keystrokes to
mechanically separate those strokes when the computer was
connected to a live internet connection from those entered when the
computer was not so connected.1" ' In that case, United States v.
Scarfo, the keystrokes made when the computer was not connected
were recorded."°  Since the strokes were thus entirely within the
computer system at that point, the interception was found not to
violate the Wiretap Act, and therefore was not suppressed."13
Nevertheless, while Scarfo did not focus on the meaning of, and
potential limitations inherent in, the definition of "electronic
communication," it indicates the importance the trial court placed on
determining whether the intercepted keystrokes were transmitted
within, or beyond, the defendant's computer: Because the intercepted
keystrokes were not transmitting beyond the computer, the trial court
held that the provisions of the Wiretap Act did not apply.'"
However, the analysis in Scarfo did not clearly find that the message
was not a communication in transmission at all because it had not
been sent. Its language is equally consistent with finding
transmission, but not in interstate commerce, so the Wiretap Act did
not apply for jurisdictional reasons, even if the keystrokes being sent
within the computer were part of the process of transmission that
would otherwise be covered. Nevertheless, in applying the language
of the statute in Ropp, Judge Feess concluded: "[t]hough the
reasoning of Scarfo is flawed in some respects, its discussion of facts
that are analogous to those presented in this case provides some
support for the proposition that the transmission of signals within a
computer do not constitute 'electronic communications' within the
Act." ' 05
In Councilman, the defendant was an officer for a company that
dealt in rare books and provided email services to its subscribers,
many of whom were rare book dealers.'" Councilman was initially
charged with unlawful interception of in-transit electronic
101. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 835-36 (analyzing United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp.
2d 572 (D.N.J. 2001)).
102. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 582.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 836.
106. Councilman 1 418 F.3d 67, 70 (1st Cir. 2005).
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communications under the Wiretap Act because he had directed
employees to intercept and copy incoming communications from
Amazon.com to his customers, with the intent of giving his own
service a competitive advantage.' 7 The incoming messages were
simultaneously sent on to the intended recipient and also copied to a
mailbox for Councilman's employees to read."° The District Court
reversed its initial denial of defendant's motion to dismiss after
reevaluating the statutory language.°  Guided by the reasoning of
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, the court interpreted the statutory
language to find that the Wiretap Act did not apply because the
message was in storage on the server, albeit temporarily, at the time it
was seized and copied."0 A divided panel of the First Circuit affirmed
the District Court,"' but an en banc review subsequently reversed."2
The First Circuit eventually held that the Wiretap Act applies when
access is made to electronic communications even in storage, so long
as the storage was incidental to transmission."3 The court's reasoning
has been described as developing a "contemporaneity" test for
whether stored information is still in the process of transmission,
which may be adopted by other courts in dealing with the difficult
issue of whether emails that have been sent to the mailbox of the
intended recipient, but are as yet unread, are still in the process of
transmission, and thus protected under the Wiretap Act."
4
The First Circuit's en banc majority opinion was written by Judge
Lipez, who had dissented in the earlier proceeding."5 Notably, he
found that neither the plain meaning of the statute nor its legislative
history were useful in deciding whether the defendant had violated
the Wiretap Act, or merely the SCA, in obtaining copies of the
contents of the transmission while it was in temporary storage:
107. Id. at 70-71.
108. Id. at 70.
109. United States v. Councilman (Councilman II1), 245 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321 (D. Mass
2003).
110. Id. at 321 (interpreting Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir.
2002)).
111. Councilman II, 373 F.3d 197, 203-04 (1st Cir. 2004).
112. Councilman I, 418 F.3d 67, 69 (1st Cir. 2005).
113. Id. at 77, 85.
114. Michael D. Roundy, The Wiretap Act - Reconcilable Differences: A Framework
for Determining the "Interception" of Electronic Communications Following United States
v. Councilman's Rejections of the Storage/Transit Dichotomy, 28 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
403, 425 (2006).
115. Councilman 1, 418 F.3d at 69; Councilman 11, 373 F.3d at 204.
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In short, the ECPA's plain text does not clearly state whether
a communication is still an "electronic communication" within
the scope of the Wiretap Act when it is in electronic storage
during transmission. Applying canons of construction does
not resolve the question. Given this continuing ambiguity, we
turn to the legislative history."'
After a lengthy examination of legislative history, the Councilman
majority concluded that it, too, was inconclusive on whether an email
in temporary storage during transmission was covered by the Wiretap
Act:
If the addition of the electronic storage clause to the
definition of "wire communication" was intended to remove
electronic communications from the scope of the Wiretap Act
for the brief instants during which they are in temporary
storage en route to their destinations-which, as it turns out,
are often the points where it is technologically easiest to
intercept those communications-neither of the Senate co-
sponsors saw fit to mention this to their colleagues, and no
one, evidently, remarked upon it. No document or legislator
ever suggested that the addition of the electronic storage
clause to the definition of "wire communication" would take
messages in electronic storage out of the definition of
"electronic communication." Indeed, we doubt that Congress
contemplated the existential oddity that Councilman's
interpretation creates: messages-conceded by stipulation to be
electronic communications-briefly cease to be electronic
communications for very short intervals, and then suddenly
become electronic communications again. Cf. H.R.Rep. No.
99-647, at 35 ("[t]he term 'electronic communication' is
intended to cover a broad range of communication
activities.... Communications consisting solely of data...
would be electronic communications.").
In sum, the legislative history indicates that Congress
included the electronic storage clause in the definition of
''wire communication" provision for the sole reason that,
without it, access to voicemail would have been regulated
solely by the Stored Communications Act. Indeed, that is
exactly what happened when Congress later removed the
116. Councilman 1, 418 F.3d at 76.
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explicit reference to "electronic storage" from the definition
of "wire communication" in the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism...."'
A 2005 civil case, O'Brien v. O'Brien, also used contemporaneity
in determining whether messages were intercepted or merely
accessed as a stored communication."' Mrs. O'Brien had placed
software on a computer used by her husband to play Yahoo
Dominoes with another woman."9 Unknown to the husband, the
software made copies of instant messages and email exchanges
between the husband and the other woman, and saved them for later
retrieval by the wife.12 The husband sought to bar admission of the
copies in their divorce case, arguing that it was illegally obtained. 1
The Florida statute involved 22 was similar to the federal Wiretap Act,
so the judge expressly followed reasoning that has been applied to the
Wiretap Act in coming to his conclusion that the messages were
"intercepted" rather than merely retrieved from storage."
The Wife argues that the communications were in fact
stored before acquisition because once the text image became
visible on the screen, the communication was no longer in
transit and, therefore, not subject to intercept. We disagree.
We do not believe that this evanescent time period is
sufficient to transform acquisition of the communications
from a contemporaneous interception to retrieval from
electronic storage. We conclude that because the spyware
installed by the Wife intercepted the electronic
communication contemporaneously with transmission, copied
it, and routed the copy to a file in the computer's hard drive,
117. Id. at 78-79.
118. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 899 So.2d 1133, 1137 (5th Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
119. Id. at 1134.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. FLA. STAT. § 934.02(3) (2003).
123. We discern that there is a rather fine distinction between what is transmitted
as an electronic communication subject to interception and the storage of
what has been previously communicated. It is here that we tread upon new
ground. Because we have found no precedent rendered by the Florida
courts that considers this distinction, and in light of the fact that the Act was
modeled after the Federal Wiretap Act, we advert to decisions by the federal
courts that have addressed this issue for guidance.
O'Brien, 899 So. 2d at 1135-36 (citations omitted).
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the electronic communications were intercepted in violation
of the Florida Act. 124
The judge writing the O'Brien opinion expressly relied on the
distinction between stored and in-transit communications that had
been articulated by the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Steiger."'
Steiger was charged with sexual exploitation of children and child
pornography crimes after an anonymous hacker had gained remote
access to Steiger's computer. 26  Software placed on Steiger's
computer allowed the hacker to examine Steiger's files; when
disturbing images of child sexual abuse were found, the hacker
anonymously contacted law enforcement officials, sending copies of
the images together with identifying information that he had obtained
from letters, banking records, and other data on Steiger's hard
drive. 27 A government investigator checked the information and
then obtained a search warrant for Steiger's computer, using as
"probable cause" the information from the hacker and the
corroborating and supplementary information learned from the
investigation.28
Steiger sought to suppress the evidence from the hard drive of the
computer, using two different lines of argument. He first argued that
the search of his computer was a violation of the Constitutional
prohibition against warrantless searches under the Fourth
Amendment.1 29 However, that would only apply if the search had
been by the Government or its agent. The Fourth Amendment does
not apply to searches by private persons. The Government was able
to satisfy the court that the hacker had been operating independently,
without the knowledge, much less the encouragement or support, of
law enforcement officials, in searching Steiger's computer. 30 The
court found no violation of Steiger's Fourth Amendment rights.31
124. Id. at 1137. The Florida statute, like the federal Wiretap Act, only provided an
exclusion remedy for oral and wire communications, so the data communications that
were intercepted by Mrs. O'Brien were not excludable under the statute. However, the
appellate court held that the trial court had acted within the permissible zone of its general
discretion in determining whether to admit evidence. Id. at 1137-38.
125. Id. at 1136-37 (analyzing United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1047-52 (11th
Cir. 2003)).
126. Id. at 1041.
127. Id. at 1042-44.
128. Id. at 1043.
129. Id. at 1045-46.
130. Id. at 1046.
131. Id. at 1045.
20101 STORAGE AND PRIVACY IN THE CLOUD
390 HASTINGS COMMiENT L.J. [32:3
Steiger's second line of argument raised the issue of stored
communications as compared to intercepted in-transit ones under the
ECPA. 32  Here, the argument was that the acquisition and
transmission of the information on Steiger's hard drive was an
interception, and thus a violation of the Wiretap Act,. which applies to
private persons as well as to government officials. 13  Steiger then
argued that illegally obtained evidence should be suppressed, even
though the Wiretap Act expressly provides a suppression remedy
only for unlawfully intercepted oral and wire communications. 13 4 His
argument was based on 18 U.S.C. § 2517(3), which authorizes
disclosure of electronic evidence at trial if it was acquired in
accordance with the Wiretap Act, thus supporting the position that if
it were not so acquired, it would not be admissible.1
5
The court ruled against both arguments, finding that the
information accessed by the hacker was stored, not intercepted
contemporaneously with transmission, and, in any event, that
suppression was not available for electronic communications.'36 The
Steiger court, quoting the reasoning developed through a line of cases
and statutory changes, concluded that a violation of the Wiretap Act
prohibition only would occur where the content of a message was
accessed contemporaneously with transmission:
By eliminating storage from the definition of wire
communication, Congress essentially reinstated the pre-
ECPA definition of "intercept" - acquisition
contemporaneous with transmission-with respect to wire
communications. The purpose of the recent amendment was
to reduce protection of voice mail messages to the lower level
of protection provided other electronically stored
communications. When Congress passed the USA PATRIOT
Act, it was aware of the narrow definition courts had given the
term "intercept" with respect to electronic communications,
but chose not to change or modify that definition. To the
contrary, it modified the statute to make that definition
applicable to voice mail messages as well. Congress,
therefore, accepted and implicitly approved the judicial
132. Id. at 1046-47.
133. Id. at 1046.
134. Id. See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2518(10)(a) (2006).
135. Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1046.
136. Id. at 1050-51.
definition of "intercept" as acquisition contemporaneous with
transmission. 137
In addition to articulating the contemporaneity test for
interception under the Wiretap Act, the Steiger court indicated the
limitations of the SCA to address invasions of privacy that occur
when messages stored on a home computer, even connected to the
internet, are examined without authorization.13
The SCA, however, does not appear to apply to the
source's hacking into Steiger's computer to download images
and identifying information stored on his hard-drive because
there is no evidence to suggest that Steiger's computer
maintained any "electronic communication service" as
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15). We note, however that the
SCA may apply to the extent the source accessed and
retrieved any information stored with Steiger's Internet
service provider. In sum, our reading of the Wiretap Act to
cover only real-time interception of electronic
communications, together with the apparent non-applicability
of the SCA to hacking into personal computers to retrieve
information stored therein, reveals a legislative hiatus in the
current laws purporting to protect privacy in electronic
communications. This hiatus creates no remedy. 139
Thus, a distinction developed between data stored on home
computers and communications held by third party internet service
providers, which would be covered under the SCA, if at all. Within
the home, the Fourth Amendment protections apply to limit
intrusions on transmissions and stored communications by the
government, but not by private persons. Communications held by
third parties in the process of transmission would be protected from
intrusion by both government and private persons under the Wiretap
Act. Once the communications become stored, only the more limited
protections of the SCA apply. In turn, those depend on the statutory
137. Id. at 1048 (quoting Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir.
2002) (citing Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998)).
138. Id. at 1049-51.
139. Id. at 1049 (citations omitted).
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concept of "electronic communication service," developed more fully
in Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., which is discussed below.' °
In Steve Jackson Games v. U.S. Secret Service, a 1994 case that has
been widely cited (although parts of the opinion have often been
distinguished and criticized), the Fifth Circuit found a violation of the
SCA when unread emails were accessed without authorization.' The
court was clear that for interception under the Wiretap Act,
contemporaneity would be relevant; thus, it found that unread emails
in repose in the mailbox of the intended recipient were no longer
subject to such interception.'42 However, the SCA does provide at
least some level of protection, so long as the email or other
communication is being held by an entity qualifying under the SCA as
an "electronic communications service." 1
4
1
In Steve Jackson Games, the SCA applied to information stored
on a secure website accessed by third-party users.'" In Konop, the
SCA was held to be applicable to information stored on an electronic
bulletin board service. 145  Communications stored on a home
computer, as in Steiger, would be protected by Fourth Amendment
process, rather than under the ECPA, although some courts have
strained to find that a home computer could be an "electronic
communications service. ,
14
1
One controversial decision in the Ninth Circuit found that read
emails stored on an electronic communications service were protected
indefinitely, being in electronic storage for backup protection.47
Even then, the court recognized that there was contrary authority that
has found only unread email to be protected in electronic storage
because they are still incidental to transmission. 
48
140. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008), petition for
rehearing en banc denied, 554 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2009) case divided into public and private
causes of action, cert. granted, City of Ontario, CA v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (2009) cert.
denied, USA Mobility Wireless, Inc. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (2009).
141. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 462-63 (5th Cir.
1994).
142. Id. at 460, 463.
143. See DOJ MANUAL, supra note 12, at 117-19, 133-34 (explaining 18 U.S.C. §
2703(a)).
144. Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 462-64.
145. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 2002).
146. Kerr, A User's Guide, supra note 18, at 1214-15.
147. Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 18 U.S.C. §
2510(17)(B)), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 813 (2004) criticized at Kerr, A User's Guide, supra
note 18, at 1217-18.
148. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075 (citing cases that have interpreted 18 U.S.C. §
2510(17)(A)).
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An obvious purpose for storing a message on an ISP's
server after delivery is to provide a second copy of the
message in the event that the user needs to download it
again-if, for example, the message is accidentally erased
from the user's own computer. The ISP copy of the message
functions as a "backup" for the user. Notably, nothing in the
Act requires that the backup protection be for the benefit of
the ISP rather than the user. Storage under these
circumstances thus literally falls within the statutory
definition.
149
The Department of Justice ("DOJ") takes the position that after
an email message has been read, it may no longer be protected as a
communication stored at an electronic communications service,
although the SCA does distinguish between communications stored
with a remote computing service and those stored with a third party
that provides internet service for electronic communications.""
According to the DOJ's reasoning, once the recipient retrieves the e-
mail, however, the communication reaches its final destination."5 If a
recipient then chooses to retain a copy of the accessed
communication on the provider's system, because the process of
transmission to the intended recipient has been completed, the copy
is simply a remotely stored file.1"2
C. Privacy Protection Varies with the Location and Function of the Place
of Storage
In addition to the time point in determining whether a particular
communication is in transit or stored, the legislation also sets up
different treatment that turns on the nature of the entity holding a
stored communication. Communications in storage at an "electronic
communications service," such as Yahoo! or Gmail, would be
protected by requiring a warrant based on probable cause, under
independent judicial supervision, for access by law enforcement
149. Id.
150. DOJ MANUAL, supra note 12, at 123-24.
151. Id. at 124.
152. Id. (citing Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir. 2004)
(finding that an e-mail acquired from post-transmission storage was not in "electronic
storage" so its acquisition was not a violation of the Wiretap Act)). Contrary to the
Theofel holding, the DOJ cites H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 64-65 (1986), as "noting
Congressional intent that opened e-mail left on a provider's system be covered by
provisions of the SCA relating to remote computing services, rather than provisions
relating communications in 'electronic storage."' Id.
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agents;153 as noted above, a Wiretap Act "super" warrant is not
required because the communications are stored. If the storage is in a
"remote computing service," access is even less protected, needing
only a subpoena or court order to obtain access. '54 When the ECPA
was enacted, it was a common practice for enterprises to transmit
data to such "remote computing services" which would provide a
level of computing power that was generally too expensive at the time
for each user to own and maintain.'55 Centralized servers would hold
the data and provide operations that required that level of computing
power, such as calculation and database functions.'56 That pattern of
operations changed dramatically in the two decades after the ECPA
as the price of computing power fell dramatically and more user-
friendly software interfaces permitted data handling by operators
with less skill. 7 However the current shift toward cloud computing
would again locate data, including stored communications, in entities
that would hold them as a "remote computing service." Even under
long-established patterns of usage, multiservice entities are popular
that provide not only transmission of email initially but also storage,
ready retrieval and searching, and integration with other services,
such as Google's Gmail. The provision of such a range of services
leaves ambiguous the intent of the recipient of the message in placing,
or in not removing, a communication held by that entity. When read
email is left in one's account with Gmail, for example, the intent may
be to use it as data for retrieval by the Google search engines, rather
than to hold it as a backup for the initial communication. In addition
to communications held on third-party computers, privacy protection
issues have arisen for those held on home computers and on personal
devices, particularly including cellphones and other portable
communications devices, such as netbook computers. "8
In cases where delivered and stored, or unread, email has been
accessed within a privately-held system, courts have looked at the
153. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006).
154. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (2006).
155. Kerr, A User's Guide, supra note 18, at 1213-14.
156. Id. at 1214.
157. See, e.g., Helpdesk Pro, Web-Based Customer Service Software-the benefits of
choosing web enabled applications, http://www.helpdeskpro.net/web-basedsoftware.htm
(last visited Apr. 5, 2010). See also Dillard Boland, et al., How Emerging Technologies are
Changing the Rules of Spacecraft Ground Support, Space Mission Operations and Ground
Data Sys. - SpaceOps '96, EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY, 328, 332 (1996), available at
http://articles.adsabs.harvard.edu/full/1996ESASP.394..328B/ 0000328.000.html.
158. See Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622 (E.D. Pa. 2006). See
also infra note 185.
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"facility" language in the SCA to find whether such access would be
actionable.'59 The SCA provides some protection for information
held by a "remote computing service" and greater protection when
the information is in an "electronic communication service." The
distinction in protections between these two types of services was
highlighted in the 2008 Ninth Circuit case, Quon v. Arch Wireless
Operating Co.' 6 There, the court examined the role of the ISP to see
whether it held stored messages as an electronic communication
service or if it functioned as an remote computing service.16 1 If Arch,
the third party ISP, was holding the messages as an electronic
communication service, then plaintiff Quon could maintain a civil
action for violation of the SCA because Arch had released the
content of the message to the employer, which was paying for the
service, since the employer was not the addressee.1
62
Even if the facility is one where protection against access is
provided, a violation of the SCA may not be found merely because
someone has access to one's emails and other electronic
communications in storage: the scope of authority for access will be
examined as well. Parties to the communication have authority not
only to access stored communications themselves, but also to give
others permission to do s0.163 In a 2002 Ninth Circuit case, Konop v.
159. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 880 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing
authorized access to stored communications through a "user"); In re JetBlue Airways
Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 309 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (examining the "electronic
communication service" limitations of the SCA). In JetBlue, the airline's computerized
reservation system was held not to be an ECS; although customers could use the airline's
system to transmit data, the airline itself was not a provider of electronic communication
services, but rather was a consumer of such services. In re JetBlue Airways, 379 F. Supp.
2d at 309. Therefore the airline could not be held liable for its alleged disclosure of
customer records. Id. at 310. See also Garcia v. Haskett, No. C 05-3754 CW, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 46303, at *11-14 (N.D. Cal June 30, 2006) (further developing the definition
of an electronic communications system stated in JetBlue). "According to the Complaint,
the Partnership is a limited liability partnership engaged in the practice of law, and it
purchases electronic communication services through Tri-Valley; it is not a 'facility
through which an electronic communication service is provided."' Id. at *13.
160. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008), petition for
rehearing en banc denied, 554 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2009) case divided into public and private
causes of action, cert. granted, City of Ontario, CA v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (2009) cert.
denied, USA Mobility Wireless, Inc. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (2009).
161. Id. at 900.
162. Id. at 900; 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3) (2006).
163. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1) (2006) permits service providers to disclose the contents of
stored communications "to an addressee or intended recipient of such communication or
an agent of such addressee or intended recipient." 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3) permits a similar
exception with respect to remote computing services. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(2)
(2006), a "user" of the service can authorize a third party's access to the communication.
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Hawaiian Airlines,'64 an employee who himself had permission to
access a protected bulletin board website, which was intended only
for employees, could authorize his employer to access the
information, even against the express terms of the poster of the
data.6' Both Quon and Konop are discussed in more detail below.
In Quon, the communications were records of data transmissions
over pagers provided by the city to police officers.' There was a
monthly cap on the transmissions, which Officer Quon and others
exceeded from time to time. 167 Department policies were in place,
and signed by the officers, retaining the right of the department to
look at communications and specifically warning the officers that they
should have no expectation of privacy in the communications.'
6
However, the officer in charge of handling the overage situation
assured Quon that he did not want to get into the auditing business
and that, if Quon simply paid the overage each month as a personal
expense, he would not do so. 69 Quon in fact paid the overage on
several occasions. 170
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the application of the Fourth
Amendment protections. 17' It found that Quon would be able to
bring a claim against the city to argue that he did have an expectation
of privacy because of the assurance of the officer in charge and past
practice, even in the face of the Policy.17 Thus for a claim based on a
violation of Constitutionally-protected privacy rights, the court found
that Quon could proceed to the next step, a "reasonableness" inquiry:
Under the "general Fourth Amendment approach," we
examine "the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether a search is reasonable."..... "The reasonableness of a
search is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree
to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the
other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.""'
164. Konop, 302 F.3d at 879-80.
165. Id.
166. Quon, 529 F.3d at 898.
167. Id. at 897.
168. Id. at 896.
169. Id. at 897.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 903.
172. Id.
173. Id. (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001)).
The claim under the SCA was against the provider, Arch Wireless
Operating Co., charging that it violated Quon's rights in releasing the
contents of the messages to the city when the city requested them."'
The communications were heavily of a personal nature, involving
specific sexual references. 75 Under the SCA, to receive the higher
degree of protection, the communication must be held by an
electronic communication service in "electronic storage":
(1) a person or entity providing an electronic communication
service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person
or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic
storage by that service; and (2) a person or entity providing
remote computing service to the public shall not knowingly
divulge to any person or entity the contents of any
communication which is carried or maintained on that service
176
However, the SCA has exceptions carved into it for voluntary
disclosures of communications:
A provider described in subsection (a) may divulge the
contents of a communication- (1) to an addressee or... (3)
with the lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or
intended recipient of such communication, or the subscriber in
the case of remote computing service .... 7"
If Arch's activities made it an "electronic communications
system," then the messages were protected from disclosure without
Quon's permission. However, if Arch were acting as merely a
"remote computing service," then it would not be liable for turning
over the content to its subscriber, the city, who was paying for the
service. 171
Under the language of the statute, an electronic communication
service "provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire
or electronic communications." 19 The text messaging pager services
provided by Arch would likely meet that definition. A remote
174. Id. at 902.
175. Id. at 898.
176. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (2006).
178. Quon, 529 F.3d at 895-96.
179. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006).
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computing service provides "computer storage or processing services
by means of an electronic communications system."' Arch did store
messages, both temporarily, pending retrieval by the addressee, and
archivally. 18' However the Ninth Circuit did not hesitate to find Arch
to be an electronic communication service noting that "Congress
contemplated this exact function could be performed by an electronic
communication service as well, stating that an electronic
communication service would provide (A) temporary storage
incidental to the communication; and (B) storage for backup
protection. '' "2
Although the court went on to acknowledge that information
going to and from a remote computing service would travel through
an electronic communications system, it concluded that a remote
computing service was a facility whose dominant function was either
storage or sophisticated offsite data processing for its clients.183
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that "[w]hen Arch Wireless
knowingly turned over the text messaging transcripts to the City,
which was a 'subscriber,' not 'an addressee or intended recipient of
such communication,' it violated the SCA. 84
Text messages, such as those involved in Quon, have become a
major mode for communications, and therefore the degree of
protection for privacy in them has begun to be examined by courts in
actions under the Wiretap Act, the SCA, and their state law
analogues. 185
In a 2006 District of Columbia case, United States v. Jones, U.S.
District Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle found that the Wiretap Act does
not apply to the government's acquisition of text messages held in
storage at electronic communication service providers; therefore, it
was held that the more stringent requirement of "necessity" for
issuing a search warrant required by the Wiretap Act does not apply
to such communications. 86  She summarized a line of cases to
180. 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (2006).
181. Quon, 529 F.3d at 901.
182. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)).
183. Id. at 902.
184. Id. at 903.
185. Nicole Cohen, Using Instant Messages as Evidence to Convict Criminals in Light
of National Security: Issues of Privacy and Authentication, 32 NEw ENG. J. ON GRIM. &
CIV. CONFINEMENT 313,313 n.3 (2005).
186. United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 75-76 (D.D.C. 2006).
conclude that the text messages were held in storage and thus covered
under the SCA."7
The extent to which telephone companies and other providers of
messaging services archive messages is not clear.' However, law
enforcement officials and reporters using Freedom of Information
Act requests have been able to obtain the content of messages, as
opposed to mere "addressing" information, in cases that have been
reported in the news.'89
An alternative argument under facts parallel to those in Quon is
presented in a recent court holding that text messages by public
servants on their government-provided pagers are public records, not
protected by privacy claims at all." About 1,400 text messages
between former Detroit mayor Kwame Kilpatrick and his former aide
Christine Beatty were ordered released in an action brought by the
Detroit Free Press and the Detroit News.' 9' Another request for the
messages as evidence was granted in a civil federal court case in
Detroit stemming from the murder of an exotic dancer.'92 Among a
great deal of scandal, it was charged that the investigation was
187. Id.
188. See Marcus R. Jones & Hugh H. Makens, Traps in Electronic Communications, 8
J. Bus. & SEC. L. 157 (2008).
Text messages are a particularly difficult subject because they do not
reside on a company's server system. The way most text messaging
works is that messages are sent from one user's phone through cellular
phone towers to the recipient user's phone. The messages reside in the
memory of each user's phone. Therefore, centralized storage of such
messages is difficult without controlling the user's phone. IM's work the
same way in that normally each individual computer stores the messages
and the user may choose to delete the message trail upon exit of the
application. However, because the messages go through a gateway it is
possible for a company to store and retrieve such messages. In fact, many
vendors are actively touting this ability. However, many companies have
decided that they cannot preserve IM communications and have
prohibited their use.
Id. at 162.
189. See, e.g., Joe Swickard, Steps in the Text Message Scandal, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
Mar. 10, 2009, available at
http://www.freep.com/article/20090310/NEWS01/903100351/Steps-in-the-text- message-
scandal.
190. M. Elrick, Judge Rules that Kilpatrick, Beatty Texts are Public Record, DETROIT
FREE PRESS, Mar. 4, 2009, available at
http://www.freep.com/article/20090304/NEWS01/90303093/Judge-rules-that-Kilpatrick--
Beatty-texts-are-public-record.
191. Id.
192. Flagg v. City of Detroit, No. 05-74253, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106459, at *5-6
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 16, 2009).
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compromised for political reasons; one of the defense attorneys
unsuccessfully argued that the SCA protects text messages from
discovery in civil actions more than it does in criminal proceedings. '93
Both private parties and law enforcement officials have
introduced text message information as evidence in criminal trials. In
a recent tragic Ontario, Canada case, the prosecution introduced
30,000 pages, including months of chat sessions and text messages,
between the accused and her boyfriend, both high school students, as
evidence that the young woman was guilty of murder in inciting her
boyfriend to stab a 14-year-old student to death. 94 The evidence was
damning and both young people were convicted after jury trials. 9 In
a murder case in Texas, cell phone and text messaging records during
the time of the murders were part of the evidence that ultimately led
to a conviction." However, the summary information available in
that situation suggests that the messaging records were location-based
in nature, more like the "addressing" information that is not afforded
privacy protections, rather than content which might have more
protections, and is somewhat less likely to be preserved by carriers."
In Klump v. Nazareth Area School District, school officials were
defendants in a civil case for invasion of privacy of a student for
accessing stored messages on his cell phone. 98 The 2006 case was
brought under Pennsylvania's Wiretapping and Electronic
Surveillance Control Act.' 99 A high school student had his cell phone
193. Paul Egan, Federal Judge May Release Text Messages, THE DETROIT NEWS, Mar.
25, 2009, available at http://www.detnews.com/article/20090325/METRO01/903250378.
194. Brian Gray, Accused's Messages Led to Rengel's Murder: Crown 'I Want Her
Dead,' TORONTO SUN, Mar. 17, 2009, available at
http://www.torontosun.com/news/torontoandgta/2009 /03/17/8774781-sun.html; Jury in
Rengel Murder Trial Deliberates for 3rd Day, CBC NEWS, Mar. 20, 2009, available at
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/toronto/story/2009/03/20/rengel-trial.html; Rosie Dimano,
Rengel Defendant Venomous and Vulgar, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 20, 2009, available at
http://www.thestar.com/article/605355.
195. Natalie Alcoba, Life Sentence for Stefanie Rengel's Killer, NATIONAL POST, Sept.
28, 2009, available at
http://network.nationalpost.com/NP/blogs/toronto/archive/2009/09/28/stefanie-rengel-s-
killer-faces-sentencing.aspx.
196. Brad Kellar, Woodruff Trial Underway in Hunt County, THE HERALD BANNER,
Mar. 12, 2009, available at http://rockwallheraldbanner.com/local/x1o54522157/Woodruff-
trial-underway-in-Hunt-County; Richard Abshire, Man Found Guilty of 2005 Murder of
his Parents in Hunt County, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 21, 2009, available at
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/ localnews/storiesfDN-
woodruff_21met.ART.State.Edition2.4ad7cc5.html.
197. Kellar, supra note 196.
198. Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622, 627-28 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
199. Id. at 627 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5703, 5741 (1988) (Pennsylvania's
equivalent of the Wiretap Act and the SCA, respectively).
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confiscated by school authorities who then accessed his stored text
messages and voice mail in search of evidence that the student was
dealing in drugs.2 ' The court found that the student could assert a
claim under the Pennsylvania statute for access to stored messages,
but distinguished the school authorities' interception of incoming text
messages. 20 It found that the recipient had no standing for a claim of
interception, although the sender might. 2' The court concluded that
both the sender and the recipient would have standing to claim
invasion of privacy with respect to the stored messages.0 3 Following
federal practice, the claims based on the access to the student's phone
call log and number directory were found to be mere addressing
information, not "communication" that is protected under the
communications privacy legislation.2'
D. Constitutional Protection for Interceptions Otherwise Violating the
Wiretap Act
The preceding cases spotlight the "public/private" line in
information, with many similar cases and debates in the news.205 One
of the most fiercely litigated cases challenged the Supreme Court's
holding in Bartnicki v. Vopper2°6 that the wiretapping laws violate the
First Amendment when they outlaw all disclosures of intercepted
information, notably when the contents of the intercepted
communication concern a matter of public debate. That case,
Boehner v. McDermott, began with a 1996 conference call by cell
phone among prominent Republican politicians, one of whom was
then House Speaker, Newt Gingrich.2 ' The discussion involved
orchestrating a response to an ethics investigation; the cell phone
broadcast (a radio transmission) was picked up by a nearby Democrat
couple with a scanner and tape recorder, who just happened to have
them on hand.2°  Scanning and recording, despite its illegality, had
been popularized after 1992, when Princess Diana's conversation with
200. Id. at 630-31.
201. Id. at 633-34.
202. Id. at 633.
203. Id. at 628.
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., The Associated Press, States fight to keep officials' email from public
inspection, Mar. 19, 2008, available at
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=19816.
206. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 544 (2001).
207. Boehner v. McDermott, 484 F.3d 573, 575 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
712 (2007).
208. Id.
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her male friend on a cell phone had allegedly been picked up and
appeared in the British media.2°9 The recorded Gingrich conversation
found its way into the hands of the ranking Democrat on the House
Ethics Committee, Rep. James A. McDermott of Washington state." '
Subsequently, the recording was released to the press.2 '
The tapers were charged with a criminal violation of the Wiretap
Act.2 " They pled guilty and were assessed a $500 fine. 213 However,
the larger issue was raised when the politician whose cell phone had
been targeted, Rep. John Boehner, brought a civil action against
McDermott under The Wiretap Act and its Florida equivalent.21 ' The
politically sensitive and heavily financed case worked its way through
the courts and appeals processes, with First Amendment arguments
raised by the Democrats (public figure, truthful information
disclosed, McDermott acquired the information without illegal
action). 21 5  The Republican counterargument centered on the
conceded illegality of the initial recording of the information, as a
violation of the Wiretap Act, and the likelihood that McDermott
knew of that illegality when he allowed for release of the
information.216
On its final appeal, upon rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit issued a split decision, but ultimately affirmed
summary judgment for Boehner, finding that the First Amendment
should not protect McDermott from civil liability.27  However, the
dissent, speaking for a majority in one part, held that Bartnicki is
controlling in that the government cannot silence information of
public concern when the discloser came upon the information without
illegal actions.21
209. Nick Allen & Gordon Rayner, Diana's Squidgygate tapes 'leaked by GCHQ',
THE TELEGRAPH, Jan. 11, 2008, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1575117/Dianas-Squidgygate-tapes-leaked-by-
GCHQ.html.
210. Boehner, 484 F.3d at 576.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 577.
213. Id.
214. Boehner v. McDermott, Civ. No. 98-594(TFH), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11509, at
*5-6 (D.D.C. July 27,1998).
215. Boehner, 484 F.3d at 577.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 579-80.
218. Id. at 586.
IV. Conclusion
The rationale for distinguishing between transmission and storage
in general emerges within the historical pattern of the federal interest
in privacy protection. The Wiretap Act antedated the 1986 ECPA," 9
and is now incorporated within it. Under the initial version of the act,
Congress created a framework for protecting telephone
communications from interception by law enforcement officials. 2°
All telephone communications in that era were uttered by the human
voice and received contemporaneously by the hearer.2 ' The ECPA
extended the Wiretap Act to include data communications but, as we
have seen, human voice communications are protected by a stronger
enforcement mechanism than that provided for violations
intercepting non-voice communications,222 although both have a
higher degree of protection than such communications when
considered "stored." Western cultural tradition, dating back at least
to Socrates, treats oral communications with more deference than
written ones:
even the best of writings are but a reminiscence of what we
know, and that only in principles of justice and goodness and
nobility taught and communicated orally for the sake of
instruction and graven in the soul, which is the true way of
writing, is there clearness and perfection and
seriousness.... 223
Fixation and retrieval mechanisms could be a basis for that tradition,
as suggested in the Phaedrus
2 4
219. The Wiretap Act was initially enacted June 19, 1968, P.L. 90-351, Title III, § 802,
82 Stat. 212. Antedating it, § 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat.
1103 (1934), "prohibited the 'interception' and 'divulgence' or 'use' of the contents of a
wire communication. At passage of the Act, managers of the bill observed, '[Ilt does not
change existing law."' 78 CONG. REC. 1013 (1934), cited in Memorandum of November 3,
1971, to Senator John L. McClellan from G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel, Subcommittee
on Criminal Laws and Procedures, available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/senate/udiciary/sh92-69-267/249-252.pdf.
220. The Wiretap Act, P.L. 90-351, Title III, § 802, 82 Stat. 212 (1968).
221. Id.
222. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2006) (providing suppression remedy only for wire and
oral communications, but not data communications).
223. PLATO, PHAEDRUS (Benjamin Jowett trans.) (360 B.C.E.), available at
http://classics.mit. edu/Plato/phaedrus.html.
224.
But when they came to letters, This, said Theuth, will make the
Egyptians wiser and give them better memories; it is a specific both for
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the memory and for the wit. Thamus replied: 0 most ingenious Theuth,
the parent or inventor of an art is not always the best judge of the utility
or inutility of his own inventions to the users of them. And in this
instance, you who are the father of letters, from a paternal love of your
own children have been led to attribute to them a quality which they
cannot have; for this discovery of yours will create forgetfulness in the
learners' souls, because they will not use their memories; they will trust
to the external written characters and not remember of themselves. The
specific which you have discovered is an aid not to memory, but to
reminiscence, and you give your disciples not truth, but only the
semblance of truth; they will be hearers of many things and will have
learned nothing; they will appear to be omniscient and will generally
know nothing; they will be tiresome company, having the show of
wisdom without the reality.
Phaedr. Yes, Socrates, you can easily invent tales of Egypt, or of any
other country.
Soc. There was a tradition in the temple of Dodona that oaks first gave
prophetic utterances. The men of old, unlike in their simplicity to young
philosophy, deemed that if they heard the truth even from "oak or rock,"
it was enough for them; whereas you seem to consider not whether a
thing is or is not true, but who the speaker is and from what country the
tale comes.
Phaedr. I acknowledge the justice of your rebuke; and I think that the
Theban is right in his view about letters.
Soc. He would be a very simple person, and quite a stranger to the
oracles of Thamus or Ammon, who should leave in writing or receive in
writing any art under the idea that the written word would be intelligible
or certain; or who deemed that writing was at all better than knowledge
and recollection of the same matters?
to "write" his thoughts "in water" with pen and ink, sowing words which
can neither speak for themselves nor teach the truth adequately to
others?
Phaedr. No, that is not likely.
Soc. No, that is not likely-in the garden of letters he will sow and plant,
but only for the sake of recreation and amusement; he will write them
down as memorials to be treasured against the forgetfulness of old age,
by himself, or by any other old man who is treading the same path. He
will rejoice in beholding their tender growth; and while others are
refreshing their souls with banqueting and the like, this will be the
pastime in which his days are spent.
Phaedr. A pastime, Socrates, as noble as the other is ignoble, the pastime
of a man who can be amused by serious talk, and can discourse merrily
about justice and the like.
[32:3
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Oral communications address a known audience in the speaker's
immediate presence, rather than future viewing by an unknown
audience. The traditional law school teaching technique of "Socratic"
dialogue recognizes the value of incorporating into the
communication the speaker's fund of information and organizational
structures held concurrently in the speaker's memory, rather than
located in written sources used to refresh memory. However, in the
past, writings have been organized in linear mode, and disparate
writings might be connected chronologically while writings related in
subject matter would not be aggregated systematically."z By contrast,
modern digital technologies and installations, such as Google's
software and server farms, collect immense archives of data, including
communications, and search techniques allow us to retrieve it, using
tailored aggregation filters, at the speed of light.226 Hyperlinking and
other nonlinear techniques of expression may challenge the Socratic
analysis.
Soc. True, Phaedrus. But nobler far is the serious pursuit of the
dialectician, who, finding a congenial soul, by the help of science sows
and plants therein words which are able to help themselves and him who
planted them, and are not unfruitful, but have in them a seed which
others brought up in different soils render immortal, making the
possessors of it happy to the utmost extent of human happiness."
Id.
225. Allan Kotmel, Hypertext vs. Papertext: Linear vs. Non-Linear, Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute, 1996,
http://www.rpi.edu/deptlllc/webclass/web/filigree/kotmel/linear.html (last visited Mar. 26,
2010). For example,
there are many different linear paths through the networked content;
that the content is often created in a 'linear mode' - that is, I have read
through a series of posts, comments [sic] etc, in some sort [sic] order then
add my own; that the time order in which content is created is not
necessarily the order in which it will be read (for example, suppose post
A and B were written yesterday, independently of and in ignorance of
each other; I post a comment C to A that furthers the argument A and
then links and leads into B which takes the argument yet further; the
linear reading order is ACB; the content creation order could have been
ABC or BAC).
To a certain extent, there is an element of luck involved in the path a
reader takes as they click through a linked network of resources.
Comment of Tony Hirst to OUseful.Info, the blog, http://ouseful.wordpress.com
/2009/01/30/non-linear-uncourses-time-for-linked-ed/ (Jan. 31, 2009, 12:31 PM).
226. Luiz Andr6 Barroso, Jeffrey Dean, & Urs Holzle, Web Search for a Planet: The
Google Cluster Architecture, IEEE COMPUTER SOC'Y, Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 23-24, available
at http://labs.google.com/papers/googlecluster-ieee.pdf.
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A lesser value attaching to communications that are "fixed" in
writing, such as text messages or email, would support the statutory
framework privileging oral/aural communications over written ones.
Professor Orin S. Kerr, who has written extensively on the SCA,227
suggests that the difference in treatment is based on the technical
means by which the intrusion is accomplished: that interceptions of
oral and wire communications require ongoing surveillance of the
communication medium, while investigation of a stored
communication requires only seeking and obtaining the target
communication itself. 28 However, that does not adequately address
the higher protection given to oral/aural communications in
transmission as compared to data communications in transmission.
On the other hand, both the data transmission and the data in storage
are fixed in writing. Perhaps the connection should be drawn
between the immediate "fixation" in the email or text message and
the more enduring "fixation" that "storage" implies. The
contemporaneity of oral/aural interchange may thus be seen as
analogous to the exchange provided by "contemporaneity" that the
case law has developed as the defining element of "transmission" as
distinct from "storage." Thus, the privileging of in-transit data
communications over stored communications would be based, not on
an expectation of privacy in the ephemeral spoken word, but rather in
the nature of contemporaneous communication as compared to that
which has been not only fixed, but also stored away, far from its initial
context or the opportunity for the participants in the communication
to amplify or correct understanding by discourse.
The absence of philosophical insight, the ambiguity and
sketchiness of legislative guidance, and the complexity of the
statutory language have resulted in cases defining "storage" under the
SCA, and thus delimiting privacy protections, that have been fairly
described as "incoherent and arbitrary" by Professor Kerr.29
Professor Kerr has suggested that providing an exclusionary rule for
violations of the SCA would lead to more clarity."0 However, if the
exclusionary remedy is not available for violations of the SCA, the
result is likely to be greater privacy protection in the civil claims
cases. The analysis in civil cases, as in O'Brien and Konop, relies
227. Kerr, Lifting the "Fog," supra note 48; Kerr, A User's Guide, supra note 18.
228. Kerr, A User's Guide, supra note 18, at 1231.
229. Id. at 1233.
230. Id. at 1241.
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heavily on definitions developed in the criminal context.
Continuing to confine the exclusion remedy to violations involving
transmission of communications of the human voice, rather than data
in transit and storage, would reduce prosecutorial pressure on courts
to allow credible evidence obtained in criminal cases by means that
are challenged as violating privacy protections. Thus, the zone of
protection for data and stored communications would not be reduced
by borderline cases.
Professor Kerr has also suggested that the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act should be used as the basis for criminal prosecution of
intrusions into stored communications and that the criminal provision
of the SCA be repealed as redundant and confusing. 232 However, a
strong case can be made that Congress should instead repeal the
provision of a civil remedy for violations of both the Wiretap Act and
the SCA. The interpretational eddies and cross-currents that have
resulted from applying the same statutory language in the different
contexts of civil and criminal cases could thus be avoided. Retaining
federal criminal provisions while eliminating the civil claim remedies
would still provide a unified federal approach to set a baseline for
protecting electronic communications. State laws provide civil
remedies for privacy intrusions. The provision of civil remedies in
federal criminal legislation should be cautiously evaluated in view of
their potential to clog federal court dockets, and to extend federal
control and restrictions over tort-like litigation and remedies, without
a specific examination of the issues that such extension raises.
231. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 899 So.2d 1133, 1134-35 (5th Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005);
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir.2002).
232. Kerr, A User's Guide, supra note 18, at 1239-40. Repealing expansive criminal
provisions in federal legislation has been widely advocated in the past decade. See
generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505 (2001); John S. Baker, Jr., Measuring the Explosive Growth of Federal Crime
Legislation, THE FEDERALIST SOC'Y (Oct. 2004), available at http://www.fed-
soc.org/doclib/20080313.CorpsBaker.pdf; Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization
Phenomenon, 54 AM. U.L. REV. 703 (2005); Brian Walsh, Doing Violence to the Law: The
Over-Federalization of Crime, 20 FED. SENT'G REP. 295 (June 2008).
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